中文摘要：

彩票悖论是一个关于信念合理接受的重要归纳悖论。它的所谓标准解决方案是用弱演绎闭合条件取代演绎闭合条件。但这一策略不仅不符合日常实践和科学实践,而且违反了RZH解悖标准中的非特设性要求。近来流行的融贯论路径方案认为如果一个信念属于一个不融贯的或自毁的信念集,那么它是不能被合理接受的。显然,这一类型的方案会陷入知识论的保守主义窠臼。在批判和吸收这些方案合理之处的基础上,提出了一个强贝耶斯方案。该方案强调认知情境对信念接受的重要影响,在情境语义学的构架下对彩票悖论作了新的解决,并使之得到了有力的哲学辩护。

英文摘要：

Lottery paradox is an important inductive paradox about rational acceptance of belief.The so-called standard solution is to replace closure principle with weak closure principle.But this strategy doesn＇t accord with our intuitions and violates the non-ad hoc principle of RZH standards for paradox solution.At the same time,the popular coherentism solutions on epistemology approach are too conservative in knowledge and belief acceptance.Absorbing the merits of these solutions,the author proposes a new strengthened Bayesian solution.This solution emphasizes the significance of cognitive situations to belief acceptance,and solves the lottery paradox under the frame of situation semantic theory.The new solution is also strongly philosophically defended.