中文摘要：

中国资本市场于2010年3月31日正式放开卖空管制,投资者可以对特定的股票进行卖空。放松卖空管制后,大股东如果继续侵占公司利益,投资者可通过卖空公司股票对大股东进行制衡。当卖空导致的股价下跌损失大于大股东侵占现金的收益时,现金资产被侵占的可能性降低,现金价值会有所提升。本文采用2007-2014年的中国上市公司为样本,借助放松卖空管制这一外生事件检验了这一问题,研究发现,放松卖空管制提高了公司的现金价值,并且这一影响主要体现在第一大股东持股比例较高的民营企业样本。

英文摘要：

Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges allowed the short sale on designated stocks since March 31, 2010. Mter lifting the short sale constraint, investors can sell short the stocks if controlling shareholders tunnel cash away from the firm for private benefits, and thus the stock price will decline. Compared with firms that cannot be sold short, the incentive to siphon cash away of controlling shareholders of firms that can be sold short may be mitigated, if the costs of price decline are larger than the private benefits of siphoning cash. Therefore, the market value of cash will increase due to the disciplining role of short sale. Based on A - share firms on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2014, this study uses the lifting of short sale constraint as a quasi -natural experiment to examine the prediction. The empirical results indicate that lifting short sale constraint can help to increase the market value of cash, and such impact primarily exist in private firms with relatively concentrated ownership by controlling shareholders.