研究了一个制造商和两个竞争型零售商组成的闭环供应链系统在面临需求扰动时的生产决策与协调机制设计问题。研究发现:当需求扰动不大时,产量和回收率决策具有鲁棒性,但销售价格始终随着需求的扰动而变动;当面临较大的需求正扰动时集中决策者、制造商和零售商都愿意改变生产决策,当面临较大的需求负扰动时集中决策者和制造商也愿意改变决策,但零售商更希望保持原有决策;收入共享契约可以协调扰动前后的闭环供应链,但当存在较大的需求负扰动时零售商要求分享更多的利润。
This paper studies the production and coordination decisions in one-manufacturer-two-competing-retailers closed-loop supply chains when facing demand disruptions. The results indicate that the optimal production quantity and return rate have some robustness, while the optimal selling price always changes with demand disruptions. We also find that the centralized decision-maker, manufacturer and retailer prefer to adjust their decisions when facing considerably positive disruptions; the centralized decision - maker and manufacturer also prefer to adjust their decisions, but the retailer tends to maintain original decisions when facing considerably negative disruptions. The coordination of closed-loop supply chain with/without disruptions can be achieved by revenue-sharing contracts, while more profits are required by retailers under markedly negative disruptions.