中文摘要：

笔者利用2010—2014年沪市上市公司数据,从政治关联的角度出发,研究了反腐败对企业捐赠的影响。在中国,寻求政治关联是企业发展主要手段之一,捐赠也被认为是企业谋求政治关联的重要方式。反腐败势必会通过削弱企业谋求政治关联的激励,影响企业的捐赠行为。以2012年末以来中国政府反腐败的政策实验为契机,笔者采用双重差分的方法 （DID）研究了反腐败对于企业的捐赠的影响。结果发现,反腐败降低了企业捐赠,对于政治关联强的企业,反腐败的作用更大。进一步研究表明,反腐败对企业捐赠的削弱作用仅存在于市场化程度较高的地区。而在市场化程度低的地区,企业发展方式单一,对政治关联的依赖性较大,反腐败没能够显著地削弱企业谋求政治关联的激励,降低企业的捐赠水平。笔者的研究不仅为反腐败如何影响企业捐赠提供了一个微观视角,对重新理解反腐败的经济效果也具有一定启发性。

英文摘要：

This paper studies the impact of anti-corruption on firms＇ donations from the view of firms＇ po- litical connection. In China, seeking for political connection is an important way for firm to develop, and do- nation has been recognized a way for firm to maintain this relation. Anti-corruption will definitely hinder firm from seeking for political connection and hence has a negative impact on firms＇ donation. Based on a quasi-ex- periment of the anti-corruption activity since 2012 in China, this study explores how the anti-corruption influ- ences firms＇ donation behaviors by using the difference in differences method （DID）. The results show that anti-corruption can reduce firms＇ donations, for firms with stronger political connection, the effect is even lar- ger. But this effect only exists for firms located in provinces with high market process. In provinces with low level of market process, firms rely more on their single developing method-seeking for political connection, and anti-corruption can not weaken firms＇ incentives to build more political connection. Hence, anti-corruption cannot reduce the amount of firms＇ donation. Our research not only provides a micro explanation for firms＇ do- nation, but also is useful to revalue the economic outcome of China＇s anti-corruption activity.