中文摘要：

职工监事作为一项体现经济民主的重要公司治理机制，其效果却普遍不被看好，而且缺乏相关实证检验。以中国2005-2014年上市央企及其子公司为样本，用企业内部收入分配情况测度经济民主实现程度的研究发现：职工监事没有起到缩小职工和高管收入差距的经济民主作用，职工监事的权利只是名义上的；职工监事可能被高管俘获，脱离经济民主的本意；职工监事的设置存在“形式化”问题。这些结论对于工会、员工持股等其他体现经济民主的公司制度改革具有重要的参考价值。

英文摘要：

Employee supervisors are the main embodiment of the democratic rights of the workers, and yet their effect are always ignored by economic theorists and firms＇ managers. Moreover, there is a lack of empirical test and mechanism analysis for the function of employee supervisors. This paper uses enterprise income distribution to measure the realization of economic democracy by exploring the sample of central enterprises listed companies during the period between 2005 and 2014. We find that employee supervisors neither increase the income of workers, nor effectively constrain executive, because most of them only have the ＂nominal right＂ rather than ＂de factual right＂ . And employee supervisors may be captured by executives, which is deviated from the original intent of economic democracy. Our further study shows that they have a tendency to be ＂aristocratic＂ . These conclusions have some implica- tions for system reforms to protect the rights of employee in corporate governance, such as the building of employee union, and the setting up of employee shareholding plan.