中文摘要：

研究由一个生产商和两个零售商构成的生鲜农产品发散型供应链，其中，生产商为Stackelberg博弈的主导者，负责提供物流服务，而零售商均为跟随者且存在横向竞争，其终端市场需求受零售价格和物流服务水平双因素的影响。针对零售商之间存在Bertrand和Stackelberg两种博弈的情形，分别建立了SSB和SSS博弈模型。研究表明：（1）若生产商提供异质物流服务,SSS中强势零售商的最优物流服务水平低于SSB中该零售商的相应值，而弱势零售商的最优物流服务水平则高于SSB中该零售商的相应值。（2）若生产商提供同质物流服务，SSS中最优物流服务水平低于SSB模型中的相应值。（3）SSB模型中，生产商倾向于提供同质物流服务；SSS模型中，生产商则倾向于提供异质物流服务。最后给出算例验证了上述结论，并进一步在特定情形下，对各模型中系统成员的价格决策和利润进行了深入的比较分析。

英文摘要：

This paper studies a divergent fresh agri-products supply chain with one supplier and two retailers. Thesupplier is a Stackelberg leader who is responsible for providing logistics service, while the retailers are followerswith the horizontal competition, whose market demands are influenced by retail price and logistics service level.Considering Bertrand game and Stackelberg game between the retailers, we establish SSB and SSS game modelsrespectively. The research shows that ： （ 1 ） When the supplier provides heterogeneous logistics service, the opti-mal logistics service level of the strong retailer in the SSS model is lower than the corresponding value in the SSBmodel. However, the optimal logistics service level of the weak retailer is higher than the corresponding value inthe SSB model. （2）When the supplier provides homogeneous logistics service, the optimal logistics service levelin the SSS model is lower than the corresponding value in the SSB model. （3）The supplier tends to provide hom-ogeneous logistics service in the SSB model. The supplier tends to provide heterogeneous logistics service in theSSS model. Finally, numerical examples are given to verify the above conclusions. Under specific circum-stances, we further contrast and analyze pricing decisions and profits of the system members in each model.