中文摘要：

中国的市场化改革呈现出渐进式特征，钢铁、电解铝这类被视为关系国计民生的资本密集型传统竞争性行业市场化进程滞后，政府保留了大量行政干预，意图保持国有企业在这些行业中的“较强影响力”。但渐进式改革过程中，中国经济市场化进程不断深入．受到原不完善市场经济体制限制的民营企业逐渐显现出成本优势。并不断扩张产能“侵蚀”高成本的国有企业的市场份额，继而引发相对低效率国有企业产能过剩。为避免产能过剩而由中央、地方两级政府共同实施的产能管制政策使得行业市场化进程进一步滞后．并且地方政府为追求当地经济增长而部分放松管制强度，这导致更为严重的产能过剩。本文从静态和动态两个维度建立理论模型．论证渐进式改革背景下竞争性行业市场化改革滞后与产能管制将共同造成严重的产能过剩。本文研究表明．产能管制政策需要在产能过剩与国有企业“较强影响力”之间权衡．但单就产能过剩来看，近十余年中用于治理产能过剩的产能管制政策很可能取得了适得其反的效果．要从根本上化解产能过剩需加快产能过剩行业的市场化改革进程。

英文摘要：

Chinese market-oriented reforms have incremental characteristics, the process of marketization in steel, aluminum and other competitive industry lags behind the whole process of marketization process of socioeconomic system, the government retains a large number of administrative intervention to maintain the state-owned enterprises ＂strong influence＂ in these industries. With the deepening of the market process, private enterprises with strong cost advantage will expand production capacity to ＂erode＂ the market share of state-owned enterprises with high-cost, which in turn leads to excess capacity. The capacity control policy to avoid excess capacity makes the market-oriented process of industry be further left behind, and local governments will ease the strength of regulation to pursue local economic growth, which lead to more serious excess capacity. This paper models the problem from both static and dynamic dimension to prove that the coexistence of lagging marketization reform and capacity regulation under incremental reform will lead to serious capacity excess problem. This study shows that the capacity control policies should be made considering the balance between overcapacity and state-owned enterprises ＂strong influence＂. But just from the view of overcapacity, capacity regulation in the last ten years may have taken the opposite effect. To fundamentally resolve the problem of excess capacity, it is necessary to accelerate market- oriented reform process in the industries with excess capacity.