中文摘要：

多属性逆向拍卖,因其具有缩短采购周期和成本节约优势而被广泛应用于政府及公司采购中,而拍卖过程中信息披露会影响采供双方收益.提出一个两阶段信息披露模型,着重分析了供应商质量属性披露的策略效应.结论表明：当供应商真实披露的概率大于纳什均衡值,供应商不核实,否则核实;当采购商信息核实概率大于均衡值,供应商真实披露,反之虚假披露,若相等则披露真假无差异.提高核实可能性,降低核实成本等方法可促使供应商真实披露,当具有不同质量属性的供应商人数分布不均匀时,应当披露质量属性;当不同质量属性人数分布较为均匀时,不披露可使采购商效用更高.

英文摘要：

Multi-attribute reverse auction is widely used in the procurement of government and companies because it can shorten purchasing cycle and save cost,while information disclosure in the auction will affect the revenue of both sides. A model of two-stage information disclosure is constructed in this paper,focusing on analysis of the effect of the suppliers＇ quality attribute disclosure policy. It was shown that： when the probability of supplier truthful disclosure is greater than the value of Nash equilibrium,buyers do not verify and verify otherwise; when the probability of buyer information verification is greater than the value of equilibrium,suppliers adopts truthful disclosure,otherwise false disclosure; if they are equal,there is no influence. Improving the probability of verification,reducing verify cost and so on can encourage suppliers truthful disclosure; when the distribution of the number of suppliers with different quality attributes is uneven,buyers should disclose quality attributes,while when the distribution of the number of different quality attributes is uniform,no disclosing can make a higher utility for buyers.