中文摘要：

当政府基于公共利益对企业实施规制,政府所代表的公共利益与龙头企业的经济利益冲突时,政府的规制行为与规制效率是否会受龙头企业影响？已有的研究较少涉及这一公共管理的重要问题.本研究从环境规制视角出发,基于1999-2013年的中国31个省级层面的面板数据,结合工业企业数据库微观数据,在省级层面实证检验了当存在利益冲突和规制能力约束时,区域环境规制水平是否会受到龙头企业以规模衡量的能力影响;如是,其方向和机制又是什么.本文研究发现：①龙头企业规模越大,区域环境规制水平越严格;②龙头企业规模对区域环境规制的影响主要通过两种路径实现,一是龙头企业所在行业的区域经济地位,行业的区域经济地位越重要,越容易引来政府的环境规制关注;二是龙头企业在所在行业的经济地位,某企业在行业的比重越高,越容易引来政府的环境规制关注＆③龙头企业规模与区域环境规制水平间关系是政府有限环境规制能力有效运用的结果,当政府规制能力不足时,政府在规制中会“抓大放小”,重点加强对龙头企业的环境规制;随着政府规制能力上升,企业规模与区域环境规制水平的正相关关系不仅回归系数会逐步下降,而且会在统计上不再显著＆最终,当政府掌握充分的环境规制能力后,企业的规模可能会在降低区域环境规制水平上发挥一定作用.本文的研究结果证实当政府与企业存在利益博弈时,政府的利益首先得到满足,仅当政府的利益得到满足后,企业才可能利用其实力影响政府规制以获取规制利益最大化.本文的研究一方面消除了“政商勾结”污染环境的忧虑,另-方面也提示要严格限制政府这只“看得见的手”的利益诉求范围.

英文摘要：

g Will the government regulation be influenced by the scale of pillar firms when the interests of firms and government conflict Literature relating this important public management topic is scarce. From the point of environmenChina4 s provincial level from 1999 -2013,and micro data from China4 s Industrial database, this paper investigates whetlier and howthe size of leading firms will influence regional environmental regulatory stringency. We find evidence tregional firms is, the more stringent the environmental regulation will be;② there are two mechanisms firm size afect regulatoryenforcement,the first path is the more important the 2 - digit industry of the pillar enterprise is ,the more stringent the environmentalregulation will be ; the second path is the more important the pillar firm in the 2 - digit industry,the more attention it will attract from the government;③ the effect of firm scale on regulatory enforcement depends on government capacity. While the government capacity is insufficient, to improve regulatory efficiency, the government will ‘ invigorate large enterprises while relaxing control over smallones 4,focus on the regulation on the large firms strategically ; withi the increasing of firm capacity,the cenvironmental regulation decrease and statistical significance diminish too; when the capacity of the governmentof regional firms will be negatively correlated with regional environmental stringency. Our work suggests that wbetween government and firm, the interest of government is overwhelming. Only when the interest of tthe scale effect of firm could improve firm interest. Our conclusions relieve the worrisome of political-commerchand, but remind the precaution of the distortion by the “ visible hand” of the government on the other hand.