列维纳斯认为胡塞尔和海德格尔的“意向性”和“存在”等观念暗含了一种将他者“同一化”的暴力,德里达则认为这些观念恰恰是承认他者的条件,它们本身是中性的,不合暴力。同时,德里达还借用了黑格尔的辩证法来质疑列维纳斯的绝对他者。德里达最激烈的批判则是指出列维纳斯使用存在论的语言来超越存在论是注定要失败的。本文认为列维纳斯“后于”他者到来的主体性本身可以有力回应德里达有关“意向性”和“存在”等的批判,而“踪迹”这一概念则可以弥合两位哲学家的诸多分歧。对于德里达语言论层面的批判,列维纳斯本人则直接作出了回应,他认为存在论的语言本身是不可完全超越的,哲学亦是一种必败的实践,但这种必败恰恰为其超越自身带来了希望,在这一点上,他也指出了他和德里达与怀疑主义的关联。
Derrida argues that Levinas' s challenge to Husserl and Heidegger is not successful, because what he criticizes such as "intentionality" and "Being", for Derrida, are not violent. Derri- da also thinks Levinas' s project to go beyond Ontology is hard to achieve since he still needs to use ontological language. The article argues the subjectivity "after" the other in Levinas, can respond effectively to Derrida' s criticism. For the issue about ontological language, Levinas has responded directly to Derrida. He indicates that ontological language is impossible to go beyond completely, thus philosophy is a destined failure. However, this failure means it still keeps some possibility to go beyond itself, it has not become the "totality". At this point, Levias also demonstrates that Derrida and his relation with skepticism.