中文摘要：

借助模拟实验，区分并比较了高收入者与中低收入者在不同税收执法策略下的税收遵从效果。实证分析表明：在影响纳税人遵从的各执法因素中，查获率对高收入个人的税收遵从度有着最为显著的威慑，处罚率和激励也与之正相关，但处罚率的影响并不显著；在税收执法的联合策略中，实施威慑与激励并用的“奖惩”组合对纳税人遵从的影响要普遍优于其他组合。因此，要最大程度地提高高收入者的税收遵从度，应当着力调整、优化当前税收执法策略，在着重提高高收入者税收不遵从查获率的基础上，构建威慑与激励有效结合的最优执法组合。

英文摘要：

Through simulation experiment, this paper distinguishes and compares the effect of tax compliance between high-income groups and middle or lower-income groups under different tax en- forcement strategies. The empirical analysis shows that, among the various tax law enforcement factors which affect taxpayers＇ compliance decision, the seized probability for high-income individuals takes on the most significant deterence, the penalty rate and incentives also have positive correlations with it, though the influence of penalty rate is not significant. Among the combined strategies of tax law enforcement, to implement the combination of deterrence and motivation has the effect generally supe- rior to all other combinations on the compliance of the taxpayers. Therefore, in order to maximize the degree of tax compliance of the high-income individuals, the tax authority should exert great ef- forts to adjust and optimize the current tax law enforcement strategies and construct the optimal en- forcement combinations of deterrence and incentive on the basis of improving the seized probability of tax non-compliance for high-income individuals.