中文摘要：

本文以2000—2008年中国规模以上工业企业和地级市数据为基础,测算了企业有效平均税率和有效边际税率,以此刻画企业税收激励,考察了财政分权对企业税收激励的影响。研究表明,样本期内企业税收激励不断减弱,不同所有制企业存在税收差别待遇,民营企业的有效税率最高。财政收支分权对企业有效平均税率具有非对称影响：收入分权会促使地方政府运用低税负竞争策略,加大企业税收激励;支出分权则导致地方政府更多运用高支出竞争策略,削弱企业税收激励。收支分权对企业有效边际税率的影响很弱,表明地方政府税收竞争进而税收激励的着力点在于吸引企业进入,对企业边际投资关注较少。纵向财政失衡会促使地方政府通过公共池渠道转嫁支出成本,导致企业有效平均税率下降,但对有效边际税率的影响很弱。地方政府针对不同所有制企业的税收竞争行为存在较大差异,对民营企业具有明显的政策歧视。

英文摘要：

This paper calculates effective average tax rate and effective marginal tax rate for enterprises under three different kinds of forms of ownership based on the data from 233 prefecture-level cities and industrial enterprises above designated size from 2000 to 2008, and explores the effect of fiscal decentralization on the corporate tax incentives. Our study shows that both kinds of tax rate in the sample period experienced a rising trend, meaning that tax incentives is decreasing. Actual tax burden of private enterprises（especially for discrete investment） is the heaviest. Granting local government more taxing autonomy will result in lowering all corporate effective average tax rates and granting more expenditure decentralization has an opposite effect. However, fiscal decentralization has weak influence on effective marginal tax rate of them.