中文摘要：

本文考察了多维晋升激励对地方政府举债行为的影响及其机理，以及“向上负责”与“向下负责”机制偏差造成的地方政府举债行为扭曲及其对居民福利的影响。研究表明，增长绩效晋升激励对地方政府举债规模具有扩张性影响，财政可持续晋升激励可以遏制地方政府债务规模膨胀但会抑制地方政府发展经济的积极性，而民生性公共服务晋升激励的影响不明确。提高债务公共投资转换率既可直接遏制地方政府举债规模膨胀，也有利于弱化增长绩效晋升激励对地方政府举债行为的扩张性影响；提高共享税的地方分成比例会促使地方政府增加举债规模，但倾向于弱化增长绩效晋升激励的债务扩张效应；民生性专项转移支付具有类似影响，一般性转移支付则具有相反作用，生产性专项转移支付既会促使地方政府增加举债规模也会强化增长绩效晋升激励的债务扩张效应。分析还表明，只有当晋升激励决定的地方政府偏好与居民偏好相符时，地方政府的最优举债行为才会提升居民福利，意味着“向上负责”和“向下负责”机制的有机融合可以从根本上规范地方政府举债行为。这对于优化完善中国地方政府治理体系以规范地方政府举债行为、实现财政经济的可持续发展具有重要启示。

英文摘要：

This paper analyzes the influence and mechanism of multi-dimensional promotion incentives and transfer payment on local government debt financing, as well as the distortion of local government debt financing caused by the deviation of ＂responsibility upward＂ and ＂responsibility downward＂ mechanism and its impact on the welfare of residents. The results indicate that GDP promotion incentive exacerbates local government debt financing; fiscal sustainability promotion incentive can curb the expansion of the scale of local government debt but will inhibit the enthusiasm of local governments to develop the economy; the effect of public service promotion incentive is not clear. Improving the conversion rate of debt and public investment is not only beneficial to directly curb the expansion of the scale of local government debt, but also can weaken the expansion effect of GDP promotion incentive on the local government borrowing behavior. Raising the proportion of local tax sharing leads to the expansion of local government debt but weakens local government debt expansion caused by GDP promotion incentive, so does livelihood special transfer payment, as opposed to general transfer payments, while productive special transfer payment not only promotes local governments to increase the scale of borrowing, but also strengthens the expansion effect of GDP promotion incentive on the local government borrowing behavior. The study also finds that only when the local official＇s preference is consistent with the residents＇, local government＇s optimal debt financing will enhance the welfare of the residents, which means local government debt financing can be regulated fundamentally when ＂responsibility upward＂ and ＂responsibility downward＂ mechanism combine organically. This study is of great significance to optimize and perfect the governance system of Chinese local government to regulate the behavior of local government borrowing and realize the sustainable development of Finance and economy.