中文摘要：

针对信息非对称性导致网络安全保险市场运行效率下降问题，进行了网络用户道德风险条件下的最优网络安全保险契约模型研究，使用委托代理理论建立了此类网络安全保险契约分析模型并对其性质进行了讨论。证明了不存在网络用户道德风险时，最优网络安全保险契约可以实现风险分担的帕累托最优并要求完全保险，此时最优网络安全保险费等于网络安全事件造成损失的期望值；存在网络用户道德风险时，最优网络安全保险契约不能达到风险分担的帕累托最优并要求部分保险，此时最优网络安全保险费小于网络安全事件造成损失的期望值。

英文摘要：

In order to solve the decline of the trading efficiency of the cyber-insurance market caused by information asymmetry, the contract model study for optimal cyber-insurance under users＇ moral-hazard was conducted. Then, the analysis model for the optimal cyber-insurance contracts was established by using the principal-agent theory, and the properties of the contracts were discussed. The analyses prove that under non-moral hazard, the optimal cy- ber-insurance contract can achieve the Pareto Optimality in risk sharing while the full insurance coverage is required, and furthermore, the optimal cyber-insurance premium is equivalent to the expected loss caused by the network security incidents; under moral hazard, the optimal cyber-insurance contracts cannot achieve the Pareto Optimality in risk sharing while the partial insurance coverage is required, and furthermore the optimal cyber-insurance premium is less than the expected loss.