中文摘要：

针对企业-客户问由信息不对称引起的道德风险和逆向选择问题，为企业和客户的交易过程提供决策支持．将信号博弈应用到客户关系管理中，分别建立了企业-客户单向多阶段信号博弈展开模型和企业-客户双向多阶段信号博弈数学模型，并利用目标分析法和逆推归纳法求出了这两个模型的分离均衡解．得到了交易过程中企业客户双方的均衡信号选择．研究结果表明，不同类型的企业和客户，其均衡信号行为不同，从而可以根据其行为结果判断其真实类型．

英文摘要：

To resolve the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection that may arise from asymmetric information between a business and customer, and to offer decision-support for business and customers, signaling game theory is applied into the customer relation management. An extended model of single-direction multi-stage signaling game between business and customer, and a mathematical model of bi-direction multi-stage signaling game between businesses and customers were established. Furthermore, methods of goal analysis and backwards induction were used to obtain the separating equilibriums of the above two models. The equilibrium signal selections of business and customer during the transaction are obtained. Reseach results showed business and customer of different types will take different equilibrium signals, which offers a basis to judge their true types.