尽管几研究检验了大股东通道行为的经济后果,很少注意都没在公司极端事件上对通道的否定效果被给予。在这篇文章,我们调查通道行为怎么影响公司级的股票价格碰撞。调查结果显示股票价格碰撞的概率被大股东断然与通道行为的程度联系。积极关系在股票结构改革的裂口以后是更显著的并且被公司节制金融条件。这研究贡献文学集中于通道和股票价格碰撞的经济后果的新兴的身体。从学习得出的结论也在中国基于大股东通道行为为投资者保护和投资公事包提供一个原则。
Although several studies have examined the economic consequences of large shareholders' tunneling behavior, little attention has been paid to the negative effects of tunneling on firms' extreme events. In this article, we investigate how tunneling behavior affects firm-level stock price crashes. The findings indicate that the probability of stock price crashes is positively associated with the extent of tunneling behavior by large shareholders. The positive relationship is more pronounced after the split of share structure reform and is moderated by the firm's financial conditions. This study contributes to the emerging body of literature focusing on the economic consequences of tunneling and stock price crashes. The conclusions drawn from the study also provide a frame of reference for investor protection and investment portfolios based on large shareholders' tunneling behavior in China.