中文摘要：

文章从政府干预的角度，以2002—2012年我国A股主板国有上市公司为样本，分析了政府干预对企业造成的政策性负担以及政策性负担如何影响以会计业绩为基础的高管薪酬契约。结果发现：在样本期间，作为政府干预代理变量的市场化程度越高，冗余雇员规模越小；冗余雇员的存在显著降低了国有上市公司高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性，使得基于会计业绩的度量评价作用减弱。研究结果表明，因政府干预而导致的微观企业的政策性负担影响了高管薪酬激励。文章在理论上丰富了政府干预对企业微观影响的研究文献，在实践中对建立市场化的高管薪酬契约具有借鉴作用。

英文摘要：

From a perspective of government intervention, this paper analyzes policy-based burden resulting from government intervention and the effect of policy-based burden on accounting-performance based managerial compensation incentives based on a sample of A-share state-owned enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2002 to 2012. It arrives at the conclusions as follows： during the sample period, higher degree of marketization as a proxy of government intervention results in small scale of redundancy employees; the existence of redundancy employees signifi- cantly reduces the managerial compensation-performance sensitivity in state-owned listed compa- nies, weakening the accounting-performance-based measurement and evaluation role. It shows that policy-based burden in micro~firms resulting from government intervention affects manageri- al compensation incentives. It enriches the theoretical literature of the effect of government inter- vention on firms at micro level and provides reference for the establishment of market-oriented managerial compensation contracts in practice.