中文摘要：

在现代公司产权结构下,委托代理关系的主要矛盾之一是对公司控制权的争夺或者说是对公司控制权的监督。在控制权失控和监督不力的情况下,具有物质资本专用性投资的大股东或创始人及其具有专用性人力资本投资的管理层将出现相互敲竹杠以及侵占对方利益的可能性。国美公司内部创始人股东和CEO之间对剩余控制权的争夺及其管理层引入的外部不可更改的投资条款方案较好地诠释了这一点。文章通过修正Holmstrom-Milgrom模型,讨论国美集团企业内部的产权结构安排的效率问题,得出了合理的公司制度可以有效保护委托人财产权利的结论。该结论说明,提高代理人分享的剩余利益有利于降低专用性人力资本敲竹杠的可能性;股权制度安排应该遵循剩余索取权与剩余控制权相对应的原则。

英文摘要：

Under the structure of modern corporation property rights, one of the main contradictions in principal-agent rela-tionship is the fight for corporate right of control or the supervision over corporate right of control. Under the circumstances of dis-order or misappropriation and inadequate supervision, the majority shareholders or the founders who possess material capital in-vestment specificity and the management who possesses human capital investment specificity are subject to the possibility of hold-up and misappropriation. This point can be better illustrated by the fight for residual right of control within GOME between its founding stockholders and CEO and by the investment clause scheme unmodified externally introduced by the management. Through the modified Holmstrom-Milgrom model, we discuss the efficiency problem of structure arrangement of property right in GOME and conclude that corporation system can protect the property rights of the principal effectively. This conclusion suggests that the increase of agents’ residual interest can help decrease the possibility of hold-up; the equity system arrangement should follow the principle that residual claim corresponds to the residual rights of control.