中文摘要：

银行信贷是我国中小企业最为倚重的融资渠道,但是银行在大力支持实体经济发展的同时也面临信贷风险。如何甄别实体企业、实现“扶优限劣”成为银企关系良性发展的核心问题。国内已有研究中考虑管理者水平异质性对银行贷款成本影响的相关研究不多,尤其以非上市中小企业为对象的研究更为少见。文章运用某大型国有银行的65293笔中小企业贷款数据,研究了管理者水平对中小企业贷款成本的影响。实证结果表明高水平的管理者有利于降低企业的贷款成本,但是其作用是非线性的,银行会综合考虑管理者水平、担保条件、企业规模、企业信用等级等因素。对中型高信用等级、中型低信用等级、小型高信用等级和小型低信用等级企业的子样本研究表明,管理者水平对中小企业的银行贷款利率、贷款担保要求影响显著。总之,优秀的管理者有利于降低银行贷款利率和减少贷款担保要求。上述研究结论意味着,金融支持实体经济的发展绝不是盲目地“放水”,而是有所选择地“滴灌”。对于中小企业来说,管理者应当努力提升自身水平,进而提供更多的“硬信息”,才能有效获得贷款融资并不断降低贷款成本。对于银行来说,不断提高信贷风险管理技术,完善信贷风险识别、分担和转移机制,才能建立银企关系的良性循环,更有效地支持实体经济的发展。

英文摘要：

Based on the bank loan data （65293 loans） of small- and medium-sized enterprises （SMEs） from a large state- owned bank in China, this paper aims to figure out whether a manager＇s quality may or not influence enterprise＇s cost of bank loans. The empirical results show that enterprises with managers of higher quality can obtain more cheap loans. How- ever, the relationships are nonlinear. The results of sub-samples of middle-sized and high-credit enterprises, middle-sized and low-credit enterprises, small-sized and high-credit enterprises, and small-sized and low-credit enterprises, reveal that a manager＇s quality has obvious effects on bank loan rate and collateral requirements. In all, excellent managers help obtain lower rate of bank loan and less collateral requirements. The conclusions of the article have passed the robustness test.