中文摘要：

通过专利公开以促进技术知识传播，是专利制度的重要社会目标之一。研究专利政策设计对创新者公开决策的影响，对完善专利制度、鼓励创新具有重要的理论和现实意义。笔者以创新者专利申请提前公开决策为视角，通过构建包括创新者决策、模仿者决策的两阶段博弈模型，探讨了创新者专利申请提前公开决策的经济理性，以及专利高度和专利宽度对公开决策的影响。笔者认为，创新者专利公开决策取决于“长保护期效应”和“技术外溢效应”的权衡。专利高度越低、专利保护越宽，创新者面临的模仿风险越低、技术外溢效应越小，更可能选择提前公开，有利于加快技术知识的传播；专利高度越高、专利保护越窄，创新者面临的模仿风险越高、技术外溢效应越大，创新者更可能选择法定公开，以减少市场中模仿者的数量。选择适当的专利高度和专利宽度、增强对已授权专利的保护，有利于实现专利制度鼓励研发投资和鼓励技术知识传播这两个社会目标的平衡。

英文摘要：

Encouraging the dissemination of technological information through patent publication is one of the most important objectives of the patent system. Analyzing the impact of patent policy on innovators＇ publi- cation behavior helps to gain more insight in areas of optimal patent design and boosting innovation. This paper develops a two-stage game theory model to analyze the economic rationale of innovators＇ early publication deci- sion. Main conclusions include： Innovators＇ publication choice depends on the tradeoff between the “longer protection effect” and “technology spillover effect” of early publication; If the patent law adopts a strong pa- tent height requirement and a narrow patent scope, innovators will choose normal publication to avoid greater knowledge spillovers; If the patent law adopts a weak patent height requirement and a broad patent scope, in- novators will choose early publication to secure longer patent protection. An ideal patent system is expected to achieve a balance between protecting profits and encouraging disclosure through an optimal combination of dif- ferent patent instruments.