中文摘要：

通过引入专利联盟成员的实质性专利产出函数研究纵向结构专利联盟的创新激励作用问题。考虑三阶段动态博弈模型：在第一阶段,专利联盟成员选择研发投入;在第二阶段,专利联盟设定单位联盟许可费率;在第三阶段,专利联盟成员在下游最终产品市场进行古诺竞争决定他们的产量。结果表明：在专利许可费收入按数量比例规则分配的条件下,纵向结构专利联盟鼓励其成员进行研究与开发,对创新有激励效应。

英文摘要：

The problem involving the innovation incentive effect of patent pools based on a vertical structure was studied by introducing the essential patent output function of the patent pool members.A three-stage dynamic game model was considered： in the first stage,the patent pool members select RD inputs;in the second stage,the patent pool sets up the unit pool royalty rate;in the third stage,the patent pool members conduct Cournot competition to determine their quantities in the downstream final goods market.In conclusion,under the condition dividing the royalty income according to the numeric proportional rules,the patent pool based on the vertical structure encourages its members to engage research and development;it has an incentive effect on the innovation.