中文摘要：

文章以我国上市公司为对例，实证研究了事务所行业专长和客户谈判能力对审计费用的影响，研究结果表明：在总体上，我国审计收费与事务所行业专业化水平显著正相关，与客户谈判能力显著负相关，行业专业化水平愈高的事务所，审计收费溢价愈多；谈判能力愈强的企业，折价愈多；相对而言，有行业专长的事务所和国际“四大”的专业化收费溢价更多；但在客户谈判能力较高时，事务所的专业化溢价水平较低；客户谈判能力的折价效应仅在“非四大”审计时存在，“四大”审计时不存在；在无行业专长的“非四大”审计时存在，有行业专长的“非四大”审计时不存在：在企业的谈判能力强时存在，企业的谈判能力弱时不存在。

英文摘要：

This paper is to research the impact of auditors＇ industry specialization and client bargaining power on audit fees, and the samples are collected from 1322 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2005 and 2006. We find that audit fees are positively correlated with auditor＇s industry specialization, but negatively correlated with client bargaining power. The higher auditor＇s industry specialization, the more audit fees; and the stronger client bargaining power, the less audit fees. In contrast, audit firms with industry specialization and the ＂Big 4＂ have higher fees than other firms. However, when client bargaining power is high, audit fees premium from specialization is less. In addition, audit fees discount effect from client bargaining power exists only when ＂non-Big 4＂ conduct audit, but does not exist when ＂Big 4＂ do. The discount effect exists when ＂non-Big 4＂ without industry specialization conduct audit, but does not exist when ＂ Big 4＂ with industry specialization do. The discount effect exists when client bargaining power is strong, but does not exist when client bargaining power is weak.