中文摘要：

研究了关于制造商的单位生产成本信息不对称时,销售商和制造商之间的采购策略问题。在对称信息条件下,通过极大值原理得到最优订货量与转移支付;非对称信息下,由于制造商单位生产成本信息隐匿,运用揭示原理,建立了销售商采购策略的最优控制模型并得到了解析解。最后对所建模型进行了数值计算和分析,数值结果显示非对称信息情况下,最优订货量变少且制造商利润增加,销售商利润减少。

英文摘要：

This paper studies the procurement strategy between a vendor and a manufacturer when the unit cost of production of the manufacturer is unknown to the vendor.Under symmetric information conditions,the optimal solution of the objective function can be obtained by the maximum principle.Under asymmetric information conditions where the unit cost of production is hidden,we have established the vendor’s optimal control model and obtained the analytic solution through the revelation principle.Finally,through a simulation experiment,it has been found that compared with the symmetric information conditions,the optimal order quantity decreases,the manufacturer’s profit increases,and the vendor’s profit decreases under conditions of asymmetric information.