中文摘要：

当今世界,人类正面临着气候变化的严峻威胁,如何解决气候保护公共品的社会困境成为学术探讨的重要问题。在经典的声誉博弈模型基础上,引入气候变化背景和假设条件,构建气候保护声誉博弈模型,从理论上探讨和证明全球气候保护公共品提供中国际合作达成的内在机理和实现条件;在达成合作的基础上,用更简明的无限重复博弈代替和辅以模拟实证,揭示各国维护国际声誉的内在动因。

英文摘要：

Nowadays,we are facing the serious threat of global climate change. How to solve the social dilemma of climate protection public goods has become an important problem of academic research. Based on classic reputation game model, this paper introduces the background and assumptions of climate change,builds a new reputation game model about global climate protection,gives the cooperation conditions of global climate protection,and proves that international cooperation is easy to achieve. Furthermore,on the basis of cooperation,this game can be instead of a simpler infinite repeated game,and it reveals the intrinsic motivation of maintaining international reputation.