以2003~2014年我国沪深股市A股工业类央企控股上市公司为研究样本,以非效率投资为研究视角,实证考察国有资本经营预算的实施效果。研究表明,我国工业类央企控股上市公司普遍存在过度投资行为,国有资本经营预算的实施以及国有资本收益收取比例的增加有助于抑制央企的过度投资。改善国有资本经营预算制度,应扩大国有资本收益的收取范围和收取比例,进一步明确国有资本经营预算的支出投向,加强对石油石化类行业中大股东占款的监管,逐步开始编制国有资本经营的中长期预算。
By taking the data published in A Stock Market of Shanghai and Shenzhen during the period of 2003 to2014 as samples, choosing industrial central state-owned enterprises as the research objects and inefficiency investment as the research perspective, the paper makes empirical study on the effect of state-owned capital operating budget. We find that the industrial central state-owned enterprises have overinvestment phenomenon widely, state-owned capital operating budget and the income collected proportions could help to suppress the phenomenon of overinvestment. To improve state-owned capital operating budget system, the government should expand the scope and proportions of income collection, further make clear the expenditure orientation of state-owned capital operating budget, strengthen the regulation on embezzlement behavior of big shareholders among the central China's oil and petrochemical companies, start to prepare the medium and long term budget system of state-owned capital operation gradually.