中文摘要：

本文以中国2004—2015年141家商业银行数据为样本，研究了资本质量对银行贷款行为的影响，据此检验资本监管制度的有效性。研究结果显示：（1）资本充足率对银行贷款发放起到抑制作用，而核心资本充足率激励银行发放贷款，两者的影响效应在金融危机时期增强，但在BaselⅢ监管预期时期减弱；杠杆率仅在BaselⅢ监管预期时期，才逐渐提高银行发放贷款的审慎程度；（2）在贷款结构方面，与公司贷款相比较，个人贷款增速对资本质量的反映程度更为敏感；杠杆率可以有效地支持银行在金融危机时期发放公司贷款；（3）在典型行业贷款方面，核心资本充足率高的银行，房地产业贷款增速较低而制造业贷款增速较高，但这一偏好在金融危机时期和BaselⅢ监管预期时期有所降低。

英文摘要：

Based on unbalanced panel data of commercial banks in China over the year of 2004 to 2014, this paper analyzes the effect of capital quality on bank lending behavior. The empirical analysis yields the following results ： （ 1 ） capital adequacy ratio inhibits bank loans, while core capital adequacy ratio has the positive effect on bank lending. Both the effect is enhanced during the financial crisis, but is weakened during the Basel Ⅲ regulation expected period. Leverage ratio really increases the caution of bank lending during Basel Ⅲ regulatory expected period. （2） For loans structure, personal loans＇ growth rate is more sensitive to the capital quality than the corporate loans＇. Leverage ratio can support the banks issue corporate loans effectively during the financial crisis. （3） For industry loans, if banks have high core capital adequacy ratio, their real estate loans＇ growth is lower but manufacturing loans＇ growth is higher, and this preference reduces during the financial crisis and Basel Ⅲ regulation expected period.