中文摘要：

在内部控制重大缺陷与潜在的私人收益（例如,更加便利的盈余操控）相关时,上市公司控股股东和管理层有隐瞒内部控制重大缺陷的强烈动机。本文通过贵糖股份的案例揭示了在上市公司被大股东控制,且股权集中的＂壕沟效应＂压倒＂利益协调效应＂的情况下,控股股东可以通过控制董事会、监事会和审计委员会的人选而使内部控制信息披露的监督机制失效,导致内部控制的重大缺陷无法得到及时的识别、披露和整改。但高质量审计师的引入,能够发挥保护中小股东权益的治理功能,揭露被隐瞒不报的内部控制的重大缺陷。监管者应高度关注大股东控制对于内部控制规范有效执行可能造成的不利影响,并为高质量审计师有效发挥治理作用创造更好的条件。

英文摘要：

When the ICMWs are related with potential private benefits, e. g. the more convenient earnings manipulations, the controlling shareholders and managers have stronger incentives to conceal the ICMWs. The case of Guitang Co., Ltd. reveals that the controlling shareholders can weaken the internal monitoring mechanisms over internal control information disclosure by con-trolling the nomination of members of board of directors, the supervisory board and audit com-mittee when the listed companies are controlled by large shareholders and the Entrenchment Effect of large shareholding outweighs the Alignment Effect ？ which will lead to ineffective dis-covery, disclosure and remediation of Internal Control Material Weaknesses （ICMWs）. The in-troduction of high quality auditors can perform a governance role in protecting the benefits of mi-nor shareholders and uncovering the hidden ICMWs. The policy implication of this paper is that regulators should pay great attention to the adverse effect of large shareholder controlling on the disclosure of ICMWs and help create better conditions for auditors to perform their governance role more effectively.