以一个风险中性的制造商和一个具有风险规避特性的销售商及2个具有竞争特性的第三方回收商组成的再制造闭环供应链系统为背景,构建了Downside-Risk测度的双第三方回收再制造闭环供应链决策模型,分析了销售商风险规避特性、第三方回收商之间的竞争关系对供应链的影响,证明了在风险共享和费用共享组合契约的控制下,Downside-Risk测度的双第三方回收再制造闭环供应链能够实现完美协调;最后,通过数值仿真研究和灵敏度分析,验证了该模型的有效性及实用性。
In the context of a risk-neutral supplier, a downside-risk retailer and two third-party logistics suppliers, a downside-risk closed loop supply chain model is established by using game theory, and the impact of revenue-and-expense sharing contract is analyzed in the channel, which shows that the contract may not coordinate such a channel on the theory of downside-risk control. Also, a risksharing contract which is composed of revenue-and-expense contract and return policy is designed that offers the desired downside protection to the retailer, provides more profits to the agents, and accomplishes channel coordination. Moreover, a case is given for justifying the effectiveness and feasibility of the risk-sharing contract.