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中文摘要：
随着我国城镇化的深入,城中村及城市边缘农村成为改造、开发的主要对象,农村土地征收带来的政府与农户之间的利益矛盾也越来越突出。基于演化博弈理论,对当地政府和被征收农民的纠纷进行溯因,发现土地征收的主要症结在于当地政府是否愿意放下强势地位,让利于民,由此提出通过将地方政府声誉及公信力收益化,激励当地政府提高征地的货币补偿或提供其他生活保障,以保证农村土地征收的顺利进行。
英文摘要：
With the deepening of China＇s urbanization, the ＂urban village＂ and the countryside on urban edge have become the main target ＇of towns＇ renewal and development. As a result, conflicts of interest caused by expropriation of rural land between the government and farmers are increasingly prominent. The paper tried to capture reasons of the contradiction for the land-acquisition compensation based on the ＇evolution game theory, and out found that the main crux of land expropriation is whether local government willing to lay down a strong position to help the people. If our central administration can make the reputation and the credibility of local government accounted by revenue, which would motivate the local government to im- prove the compensation or supply some living supports, then it will be easier to make an agreement with the expropriated farmers.
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