中文摘要：

在激励理论的分析框架下对早期阶段创新项目的财政资助政策进行了研究,主要结论包括：1）为担保创业企业家的努力投入,创新企业必须投入足够的自有资本才能吸引创业资本的进入,因此政府的财政资助可以弱化创新企业的财富约束,从而激励更多的创新活动;2）要求按比例分享项目收益的有偿资助方式帕累托劣于无偿资助,而仅要求固定回报的有偿资助则是激励中性的。根据上述结论进一步解释了创业投资家在投资项目选择上的阶段偏好现象,并分析了天使投资的矛盾性,证明了在对早期阶段创新项目的扶持中,公共资本起着不可替代的作用。

英文摘要：

The fiscal financing policies for innovative projects in the early stages are studied under the framework of incentive theo- ry. The main conclusions are as follows： （ 1 ） In order to attract venture capital＇ s entry, the entrepreneurs must invest enough private capital to guarantee their efforts input. Thereby, when innovators are constrained by wealth, the financial support from government could encourage more innovation. （2）For the onerous funding policy that public capital asks for a pro rata sharing of project benefits, Pareto is inferior to gratuitous funding policy, while public capital just asks for a fixed payment is neutral in incentives, and has almost same features as gratuitous funding policy. Based on these findings, an interpretation that venture capitalists have the stage preference when they are choosing investment projects is given. Furthermore, the contradictory nature of business angel is pointed out and it is proved that the role of public capital for supporting innovative projects in the early stages is irreplaceable.