中文摘要：

借助差异产品双寡头市场竞争模型,分析了在本国企业先行进入本国市场与外国企业展开产量竞争的情形下,一个拥有成本降低型先进技术的外国企业通过兼并或技术授权将其先进技术转移给本国企业时,东道国政府的最优竞争规制政策。研究表明,当两部收费方式的技术授权可供选择时,东道国政府应当禁止外国企业的兼并行为。然而,当技术授权的方式只能采取特许权收费或固定收费时,东道国政府应当视产品的替代程度和先进技术的创新程度等来确定是否应当许可外国企业对本国企业的兼并。此外,当外国企业既可以采取兼并,也可以采取任意一种技术授权方式转移技术时,固定收费的技术授权模式将对东道国最为有利。

英文摘要：

Incorporating a differentiated goods duopoly where a domestic firm competes with quantity against a foreign firm,we compare domestic welfare under merger and licensing,for the case of domestic firm joining in the domestic market ahead of foreign firm,and derive the optimal competition policy for home country.We show that whenever two-part tariff licensing is feasible,mergers should be prohibited,however when only fixed fees or royalties are feasible,the feasibility of licensing cannot be used as a reason to forbid mergers.Moreover,if it is profitable for the patentee to transfer its patent via either mergers or any means of licensing contracts,then fixed fee licensing is the best mode for domestic country.