中文摘要：

在季节性产品销售环境下,考虑由一个零售商和可以无限细分的顾客群体组成的两级供应链系统,研究了考虑战略顾客行为时两阶段报童模型的库存与定价决策问题。传统的两阶段报童模型没有考虑战略顾客行为对于零售商的库存和定价决策的影响,实际上顾客在购买时将会考虑产品在销售期内完整的价格路径,以最大化期望效用为目标确定最优购买时机,而零售商则以最大化期望收益为目标确定最优订货数量和设定价格路径。引入理性预期均衡分析,研究了零售商和战略顾客双方同时行动静态博弈时的理性预期均衡解,并进一步分析了零售商承诺销售价格不变时的理性预期均衡解,最后,通过2组数值算例对模型进行了说明。

英文摘要：

The two-echelon supply chain system studied in this paper is composed of one retailer and the total mass of infinitesimal customers in the market,the demand for the product is seasonal over a finite selling time horizon.The inventory and pricing decision for a two-period newsvendor problem is investigated when strategic customer behavior is considered.The traditional two-period newsvendor models don＇t consider the impact of strategic customer behavior on the retailer＇s inventory decision and pricing decision,However,customers may consider the whole price path of the product over the entire selling season,and optimize their purchase time point to maximize the expected utility,Meanwhile,the retailer may determine the optimal order quantity and set the price path to maximize the expected revenue.The rational expectation equilibrium analysis is introduced in the paper and the rational expectation equilibrium solution in the simultaneous-move game between the retailer and the customers is analyzed.Furthermore,it analyzes the situation when the retailer makes the selling price commitment to the customers and obtains the corresponding rational expectation equilibrium solution.Finally,two numerical examples are presented to illustrate the proposed model.