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中文摘要：
利用信号博弈的相关模型及理论对物流企业、银行和融资企业三方的行为进行了分析，结果显示：融资企业为了实现效益最大化，往往会倾向于向市场发送对自己有利的信息或利用较高的报酬和利润率来吸引物流企业和银行的参与。而两者在高利益的诱惑下，往往会愿意冒更大的风险，同意融资企业的提议。
英文摘要：
This paper analyzes the behavior of the three parties by the signal game theory. The result shows that： financing enterprise in order to realize the benefit maximization, often tend to send own - advantage information to the market or using higher pay to attract the participation of logistics enterprise and the bank. And under the temptation of high benefit, they are often wiUing to take more risk to participate the enterprise financing.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
A Method for Aggregating Group Preference Based on Pair-wise Comparison with Random Binary Relations
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