中文摘要：

本文以我国A股上市公司2006-2013年的定向增发事件为研究对象,考察了企业所有权性质、民营企业政治关联对上市公司定向增发审批的影响。本文主要结论如下：第一,和民营企业相比,国有企业具有更高的审批通过率和融资额度;第二,拥有较高级别政治关联的民营企业增发审批通过率更高,而政治关联与审批周期和融资额度没有显著关系。进一步对政治关联分类发现,只有代表委员类政治关联可以提升民营企业的通过率。同时,与公司披露的政治关联相比,未披露的“隐性”政治关联也可以促进定向增发的审批。研究结果说明,在我国高度管制的资本市场中,政治关联提高了企业的股权融资便利性,市场中非正式机制仍发挥着重要作用。

英文摘要：

Using A-share listed private equity placement samples from 2006 to 2013 in China, this study empirically tests the impact of ultimate ownership and political connections of private firms on the approval of private equity placements, investigating whether private firms can overcome financing constraints through political connections. Firstly, this study documents that state owned firms have significant advantages over private firms in approval procedure. Specifically, state owned firms are not only more likely to get approval of private equity placement from China Securi- ties Regulatory Commission （CSRC）, they also have significantly higher issuing proceeds than private firms. The results are robust when we employ alternative measurement of proceeds. Secondly, political connections seem to help private firms obtain approval of placements from CSRC. Private firms with high rank of political connection have higher probability of approval than firms without political connection. However, political connection has no signifi- cant relationship with proceeds. Suggesting that political connection can partially relieve financial constraints of private firms in China. Furthermore, we find that political connections through govern- ment officers are not useful for firms to obtain refinance resources, the connections of being members of the Chinese People＇s Political Consultative Conference （CPPCC） and members of People＇s Con- gress are the two valuable types of political connections to help pri- vate firms obtain approval. It seems that the connections which pri- vate entrepreneur pursue positively （CPPCC and People＇s Congress） are helpful indeed. Finally, we find that, because some connected firms didn＇t disclose their political connected information in the an- nual report （invisible connections）, firms with invisible connections also have higher approval probability than that of non-connected firms. As a result, we point the issue to further research which focuses on firms＇ political connec