中文摘要：

已有企业避税行为影响因素的研究，鲜有涉及对企业社会网络属性的探讨。作为经济的重要组成部分，任何企业都不能独立于其他企业单独存在。连锁董事的出现，在企业间建立了紧密的关系网络，还为企业私有信息传递构建了一条非公开渠道，从而促进相似行为在企业间传染。随着中国企业现代董事会制度的建立，特别是独立董事制度的引入，连锁董事在中国上市公司中成为普遍现象。因此，从连锁董事关系这一社会属性视角研究企业避税行为的传染效应具有重要意义。在构建连锁董事关系的基础上，以2007年至2014年中国A股上市公司8732条公司年度观测值为样本，将公司有效税率、账税差异和固定效应残差法计算的账税差异作为避税程度的测量指标．采用OLS回归模型对避税行为的传染效应进行实证检验。研究结果表明，通过连锁董事传递的成熟避税经验可以降低目标公司的避税成本和管理者对避税决策不利后果的担忧，导致避税行为在企业网络间传染。在控制内生性问题和替代性解释后，结论依然稳健。进一步研究发现，避税行为在同一地区的连锁公司间更容易传染，即传染服从先内后外律。最后，与CFO相比，当连锁董事为目标公司CEO时更能促进避税行为传染。以连锁董事为视角的研究可以将企业的社会属性纳入到避税行为影响因素的研究中，丰富避税行为影响因素的研究视角。构建了企业针对连锁董事信息传递的成本收益决策框架，完善了连锁董事传染效应的理论研究，对投资者和监管机构有重要的实践意义。

英文摘要：

Existing academic researches on influential factors of corporate tax avoidance rarely pay attention to corporate social network attributes. As an important part of market economy, any company could not survive without interactions with others. As a result, the introduction of interlocking directors would set up close social networks within different companies, which could also build up non-public channels for corporates＇ private information transmission, leading to the contagion effect of similar behaviors within companies with interlocking shareholders. With the development of the board system in modern companies, especially the introduction of independent directors, interlocking directors have become a common phenomenon in Chinese capital market. Therefore, it is extremely meaningful to investigate the contagion of tax avoidance from the perspective of corporate social attributes. On the foundation of interlocking directors＇ relationship, taking the listed companies in Chinese capital market from 2007- 2014 as samples, effective tax rate （ETR）, book-tax difference （BTD）, and book-tax difference computed by fixed effect residual method （DD_BTD） have been used to measure the level of corporate tax avoidance. After controlling other influential factors, the OLS model has been adopted to empirically investigate the contagion effect of corporate tax avoidance. The results revel that tax-avoidance information of tax-aggressiveness companies can be transmitted to interlocked companies through the channel of interlocking directors, which could reduce the cost of similar behaviors and decision-making uncertainty of the target companies, leading to the contagion effect of tax avoidance. After controlling possible endogenous problems and alternative explanations, such as the self-experience of tax avoidance and the group strategy within the same enterprise group, the conclusion we state above is still robust. What＇s more, further studies find the contagion effect of tax avoidance obeys the law of imita