中文摘要：

近年来,税收激进的研究越来越强调所有权与经营权分离的利益冲突会导致自利的管理层在避税的同时通过转移公司资源实现自身的机会主义行为,为股东带来非税收成本,税收激进成为一个代理问题。随着互联网的发展,媒体在日常生活中发挥着越来越重要的作用,被视为新兴转轨经济体中重要的外部公司治理力量,可以有效缓解各种代理问题。同时,在中国多种所有制经济并存的独特制度背景下,实际控制人性质不同的公司由于税收政策和代理问题的差异有着不同的税收激进动机,也为检验这一问题提供了独特的视角。在代理理论框架下,结合中国的制度背景,研究媒体关注是否及如何影响管理层税收激进行为及其经济后果就显得尤为必要。利用2011年至2014年中国A股上市公司6 839个公司-年度观测值作为研究样本,结合对120万条媒体报道文本的大数据分析,使用OLS和三阶段联立方程OLS回归进行实证检验。研究结果表明,媒体关注通过增大管理层基于税收激进的机会主义行为成本抑制税收激进;由于地方国有企业的避税动机更低,当将样本按照实际控制人性质进行拆分后,媒体关注对税收激进的抑制作用仅在中央国有企业和民营企业样本中显著;在经济后果方面,研究发现处于高媒体关注度下的税收激进公司的公司价值更高,进一步证明媒体关注可以降低税收激进中的代理成本,提升公司价值;机构投资者在管理层避税成本收益决策中起调节效应。媒体关注作为重要的外部公司治理机制之一,能有效缓解管理层税收激进中的代理问题,加深了对媒体关注公司治理机制以及管理层税收激进成本收益决策的理解,对投资者保护和税收征管都具有一定的理论和现实意义。

英文摘要：

Conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders arise because managers effectively control firms’ assets while generally do not have a significant equity stake in their firms. The separation of ownership and control implies that if tax aggressiveness is a worthwhile activity,then shareholders ought to structure appropriate incentives to ensure that managers make tax-efficient decisions to increase their wealth. Recently another perspective indicates that due to interest conflicts self-interested managers have high propensities to structure the firm in a complex manner in order to facilitate transactions that reduce corporate taxes and divert resources for private uses,which results in great non-tax cost or rent extraction for shareholders. Such non-tax costs may include earnings manipulation,bad news hoarding and outright resource diversion,such as abnormal perk consumption,overinvestment and related party transactions. Thus,more and more studies investigate tax aggressiveness under the agency theory framework. With the development of the internet,media becomes more and more important in our daily life and has been regarded as playing a crucial role in mitigating agency problems,especially for worse investor protection institutions in transition economies. Owing to the institutional background in China,different ultimate ownership firms may have different tax aggressive incentives,which also offers a unique setting to investigate this issue. Motivated by these two points under agency framework,it is interesting to investigate whether and how media coverage can affect executive tax aggressive decisions and its economic consequences.Taking advantage of 6 839 observations and more than 1 200 thousand media reports from A share listed firms in China from 2011- 2014,this study empirically tests the above research questions using OLS and 3-stage OLS regressions. The results show that media coverage restrains executive tax aggressiveness by increasing their opportunism behavior costs. Furthermore,results rema