中文摘要：

从地方政府竞争视角将环境规制＂逐底竞争＂行为内生化,进而剖析＂污染避难所＂假说的根源。结果表明：政府降低环境规制水平显著增加本地区的高耗能产业流入,证实了＂污染避难所＂假说;地方政府间环境政策博弈使得互相之间模仿行为显著;地方政府存在竞相降低环境规制标准以吸引高耗能产业投资的现象,即＂逐底竞争＂和＂污染避难所＂假说同时成立。

英文摘要：

This paper tries to make the ＇race-to-the-bottom＇behavior of environmental regulation endogenous and analyze the reasons of pollution haven＂from the perspective of local government competition. The results show that, government reducing the level of environmental regulation can significantly increase the inflow of high energy consuming industries, it verifies the existence of ＂pol- lution haven＂; there are significant imitation behaviors between local governments on making environmental policy based on game; lo- cal governments are competing to reduce the standard of environmental regulation to attract high energy consuming industries invest- ment, namely ＂race-to-the-bottom＂ and ＂pollution haven＂ hypothesis are both confirmed.