中文摘要：

本文基于公司治理和委托代理理论，以我国2011-2013年进行了财务重述的427家A股上市公司及配对公司为样本，考察管理者代理问题对公司财务重述的影响，并探讨公司的内外部治理机制对其影响的调节效应。研究结论表明，管理者代理问题与财务重述正相关；内部治理机制中的控股股东国有化性质、管理者持股对管理者代理问题的影响有正向调节作用，控股股东持股比例和审计委员会对管理者代理问题的影响有反向调节作用，而独立董事比例对管理者代理问题的治理效应并不显著；外部治理机制中的市场化进程、法律制度和媒体监督对管理者代理问题均有较好的治理效应。本文的研究对于深入理解管理者自利动机对公司财务重述的影响，以及我国公司治理机制当前所发挥的治理效应具有一定的启示意义，并能为政府相关管理机构和企业管理实践提供借鉴。

英文摘要：

Based on the perspective of corporate governance and principal-agent theory, this paper takes 427 listed companies in Chinese A-stock market which have executed financial restatements during 2011-2013 and 427 paired companies as sample, examines the impact of manager agency problem on corporate financial restatement, and investigates the moderating effect of corporate governance mechanism on their relationship. Conclusions show that manager agency problem is positively related to financial restatement; Concerning internal governance mechanism, the nationalized nature of controlling shareholder and manager shareholding have positive moderating effects on the influence of manager agency problems, Controlling shareholder＇s stake and audit committee have reverse moderating effects on the influence of manager agency problems, but independent director proportion has no significant governance effect on manager agency problem; Concerning external governance mechanism, all of marketization process, legal system and media supervision have good governance effects on manager agency problems. The conclusions of this paper are beneficial to understanding the influence of managerial self-interest on corporate financial restatement and current governance effect of corporate governance mechanism in Chinese companies; they can also provide some reference for relevant government agencies and corporate management practice. The main contributions of this paper lies in： first, based on the principal-agent theory, this paper explores the internal mechanism of manager agency problem impact on corporate financial restatement, which leads the discussion of how managers＇ self-interest motivation triggers financial restatements to more comprehensive and in-depth; Second, in view of that both of manager agency problem and financial restatement essentially belong to the category of corporate governance, since corporate internal and external governance mechanisms are actually a linkage system, this paper constructs an integrated analysis