中文摘要：

本文在委托代理理论的分析框架下,着重运用高层梯队理论,以我国2008-2012年上市公司为样本,考察了董事长既有任期、预期任期对投资挤占的影响。研究发现：董事长既有任期、预期任期与公司整体投资水平均呈显著正相关;董事长既有任期与投资挤占呈显著正相关;董事长预期任期与投资挤占呈显著负相关;股权制衡在董事长既有任期影响投资挤占中起到了缓解作用,但在董事长预期任期影响投资挤占中尚未起到调节作用。进一步区分产权性质发现,在国有和非国有公司中,不同既有任期、预期任期的董事长对各类别投资、投资挤占的影响以及股权制衡对上述关系的调节作用均存在差异。这些研究结论对于深入理解企业的投资行为,以及加强人力资源管理都具有一定的启示意义。

英文摘要：

Based on the principal-agent theory and upper echelons theory, this paper theoretically analyzes and empirically examines whether and how chairman actual tenure and expected tenure may affect investment extrusion and whether the counterbalance mechanism of blockholders may moderate this relationship, using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2008 to 2012. Our results demonstrate that, first, chairman actual tenure and expected tenure significantly and positively affect investment. Second, the chairman actual tenure has a positive and significant effect on fixed-asset investment and intangible-assets investment, but a negative and significant effect on long-term equity investment, and a positive and significant effect on investment extrusion. Third, the chairman expected tenure has no significant effect on fixed-asset investment, a negative and significant effect on intangible-assets investment, a positive and significant effect on long-term equity investment, and a negative and significant effect on investment extrusion. Fourth, the counterbalance mechanism of blockholders positively moderates the relationship between the chairman actual tenure and invest- ment extrusion, but it doesn＇t moderate the relationship between the chairman expected tenure and investment extrusion. However, these relationships show significant difference between state-owned companies and non-state-owned companies, namely, the effects of chairman actual tenure on various categories of investment and investment extrusion are more significant in non-state-owned com- panies, and the moderate effect of the counterbalance mechanism of blockholders is also more significant in non-state-owned compa- nies. The effects of chairman expected tenure on various categories of investment and investment extrusion are only significant in non- state-owned companies and the moderate effect of the counterbal- ance mechanism of blockholders in state-owned and non-state- owned companies on the whole is not significant. These conclusions are helpful