中文摘要：

无论是基于争夺经济资源的金融竞争还是自上而下的政治标尺竞争,地方政府的金融干预行为都可能呈现出空间相关性。通过构建金融干预行为的反向复合指标,且在广义空间计量模型中分别引入非对称权重矩阵与两区制划分,发现省级政府之间确实存在着针对金融干预的模仿竞争,但是误差冲击又导致了地方政府的差异化反应。同时,在政绩竞赛中落后会增强省级政府对其竞争者干预行为的敏感性,而内陆省份相比于沿海省份的空间相关程度也更高。这一结论在加强中央政府的金融协调监管职能以及尽快转变GDP导向的政绩考核标准层面,具有重要的政策启示意义。

英文摘要：

Whether it is the economic competition based on the struggle for economic resources or the top-down political yardstick competition, the financial intervention by local governments is like- ly to present its spatial correlation. This paper constructs reverse composite index depicting financial intervention and introduces the asymmetric weight matrix and the two-regime division into the gener- alized spatial econometric model, then it is found that there do exist imitative competitions towards financial interventions between provincial governments, but the error shock might lead to differentiated responses of the local governments. Meanwhile, those stragglers in the government performance com- petition will increase the sensitivity of the provincial governments towards the intervention from the competitors, while the inland provinces have higher degree of spatial correlation compared to the coastal provinces. This conclusion may have great significance in policy enlightenment for the central government to strengthen its role of financial coordination and supervision and give up the GDP-ori- ented performance evaluation as soon as possible.