中文摘要：

本文在Antras and Helpman（2004）分析框架的基础上构建了一个两地区的垄断竞争模型，考察契约执行效率与FDI区位分布的关系。理论分析表明，对于契约密集度较大的行业，跨国公司倾向于在契约制度较为完善的地区进行FDI。在此基础上，基于2006年中国分省分行业的经验研究发现，在控制了市场规模、财政分权、金融市场发展等变量后，契约执行效率对地区FDI分布差异具有显著影响。

英文摘要：

This paper develops a monopolistic competition model based on Antras and Helpman（2004） to investigate the relationship between the geographic distribution of FDI and the efficiency of contract enforcement. The model suggests that regions with high contract enforcement efficiency attract more FDI inflows, especially in industries with high degree of contract intensity. Using data across province and industry of China, we find evidence that contract enforcement efficiency has a robust effect on the geographic distribution of FDI, after controlling variables about market size, fiscal decentralization, and financial market development.