中文摘要：

本文以金融危机期间我国天量信贷扩张为背景,基于会计盈余信息的银行债务契约有用性这一视角,研究政府干预下的信贷刺激政策如何扭曲银行债务契约及其产生的经济后果。研究发现：受金融危机的影响,天量信贷致使会计盈余信息在银行债务契约中的有用性出现显著性下降,表明银行债务契约被严重扭曲,且国有企业的银行债务契约被扭曲程度更高。经济后果检验显示：金融危机之后银行债务具有更高的违约风险,且国有企业的违约风险显著更高,进一步检验价值效应还发现金融危机期间的天量信贷刺激政策虽有助于提升企业短期业绩,却降低了企业长期业绩。

英文摘要：

Under the background of the expansion of record lending during financial crisis,this paper investigates how credit stimulus policy under government intervention distorts bank debt contracts and studies its following economic results by using non-financial listed company＇s data in China from 2006 to 2011. The research shows that with the impact of financial crisis,the usefulness of accounting profitability information for bank debt contracts has a remarkable decline because of record lending.In other words,comparing with the non state-owned enterprises,state-owned enterprises experience a much more significant decrease in sensitivity. The test of economic consequences reveals that bank debts have a significantly higher probability of default during crisis than pre-crisis,and the probability of default in state-owned enterprises is much higher than nonstate- owned enterprises. Further research on value effect also illustrates that although record lending stimulus policy is conductive to promoting enterprise ＇s short- term performance,it is detrimental to their long-term performance.