中文摘要：

以2007年-2012年沪深交易所A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本,实证检验企业家风险偏好对过度投资的影响及公司政治治理对过度投资和企业家风险偏好之间关系的调节作用。研究结果表明：企业家风险偏好与过度投资显著正相关,即企业家承担风险的意愿越强,企业过度投资程度越高;公司政治治理对企业家风险偏好与过度投资之间的关系具有负向调节作用,即相比没有政治治理的公司,具有政治治理的公司会削弱企业家风险偏好与过度投资之间的正相关关系。这一结论表明,党组织（党委书记）参与公司治理能在一定程度上抑制企业的过度投资行为,提高企业的投资效率。

英文摘要：

By analyzing the data of the listed companies in China from 2007 to 2012, this paper examines the effect of entrepreneurs＇ risk preference on firms＇ over-investment and the moderating effect of political governance. It concludes that entrepreneurs with risk preference tend to over-invest; political governance weakens the positive relationship between entrepreneurs＇ risk preference and over-investment. The organization of Chinese Communist Party that participates in corporate governance can serve as an external monitoring mechanism to help to reduce firms＇ over-investment behaviors. This finding enriches the theory of corporate governance in Chinese context.