中文摘要：

在全球金融危机的背景下,企业面临着不同程度的融资约束,这种约束势必会对企业的投资效率产生影响,本文选用基于海洋博弈模型（Oceanic Games）的Shapley指数来测度大股东控制度,研究了后股权分置时代上市公司股权结构对投资效率的影响。研究发现,金融危机背景下,我国上市公司整体而言存在一定程度的投资不足,特别是非政府控制上市公司,而大股东投资决策的积极参与,能够在很大程度上缓解企业因融资约束而面临的投资不足问题,大股东的这种积极作用在非政府控制企业中更为显著。这些研究结果表明在企业面临发展困境时,大股东的自身资源和决策对企业的发展起着重要的作用。

英文摘要：

Under the background of the financial crisis, the enterprises are facing varying degree of financial con-strains, which are closely bound to companies＇ efficiency of investment.This article measures the control of large shareholder on the basis of Shapley value, and studies the effect of the ownership structure on the efficiency of in-vestment.We found that, during the period of the financial crisis, investment is generally existed in China＇s listed companies, especially in those non-government-controlled companies.We also found that, the shareholder＇s active participation in decision making will ease the insufficient investment caused by the financial contain, and this phe-nomenon is much more significant in private enterprises.Our research shows that the large shareholder＇s recourses and decision-making may play an important role, when the companies fall into development dilemma.