中国城市商业银行的股权结构具有明显的地方政府直接或通过一致行动人参股的特点,研究这种股权结构与银行绩效之间的关系及其作用机制具有重要意义。本文以2006-2010年间我国非上市城市商业银行为样本,从样本银行网站和金融时报采集数据,设置虚拟变量,构建多元回归模型,实证分析了地方政府、地方融资平台与地方城市商业银行的股权结构、信贷结构、绩效关系及传导机制。本文认为,从短期看,地方城市商业银行背靠政府这一特殊股东,有利于保证其初始成长。但因为地方政府可能出于地方利益和官位升迁的特殊考虑,存在掏空地方城市商业银行的欲望和能力,因此从长期看,应当改变地方政府对城商行的控制局面。同时,要拓宽地方政府融资渠道,完善融资平台运行机制,保证融资平台的还款来源,控制地方金融风险。
It is an obvious characteristic in city commercial banks that those stocks are owned by local governments directly or through persons acting in concert, therefore studying the relationship between ownership structure and performance has important and realistic significance. Based on the samples of unlisted city commercial bank from 2006 to 2009, this paper analyzes the relationship between local government, financial platform and ownership structure of city commercial banks by using dummy variable and building multiple regression model. Suggestions are as follows: 1)reducing the phenomena of local government or local state-owned enterprises as the largest shareholder; 2) local governments maintain the relative holding status through persons acting in concert; 3) broadening the financing channels and perfecting the operation mechanism of financing platform to control local financial risk.