中文摘要：

中国公共场所火灾公众责任保险投保率低，公共场所一旦发生重特大火灾，通常由政府承担灾后赔偿责任，这不仅使得公共经营场所业主逃脱了民事赔偿责任，而且对纳税人有失公平。本文首先提出并论证公共场所火灾公众责任险的准公共物品属性，为公共场所火灾公众责任险模式的选择奠定了理论基础；其次从社会福利的角度分析了强制投保优于自由投保模式；再次本文基于我国保险业仍处在寡头垄断阶段和法律监管不完善、理论上我国还完全具备形成价格卡特尔条件的现实，提出了初级阶段实施“强制投保、有管理的差别费率”模式，待条件成熟再逐步放松管制；最后基于准公共物品属性和合作经济学思想，提出了“商业保险公司和地方及中央政府三级联防”的运行机制。

英文摘要：

The coverage ratio of public fire liability insurance in China is very low. In case a fire occurs in a public place and the responsible party loses the capacity of compensation, the government often has to bear the compensation responsibility. As a result, the operator at the public place escapes from the civil compensation liability, which is unfair to taxpayers. Therefore, researching on the patterns and mechanisms of public fire liability insurance is of great significance. In this article, it firstly expounded on the quasi public goods nature of public fire liability insurance, laying the theoretic foundation for selecting the suitable model ; secondly , it analyzed the necessity for compulsory insurance from the social welfare angle ; then, it proposed and justified the model of ＂compulsory liability insurance and floating rate with regualtion＂ according to the property of quasi public goods; finally, based on its quasi public goods property and cooperative economics, it put forth the three-layer defense mechanism made up of the central government,local government and commercial insurance eompanies.