中文摘要：

借用博弈论的分析工具，解释在FDI压力下一方面国内企业接受来自于跨国公司的技术外溢，另一方面却有规律增加R＆D支出的现象．研究首先以A＆J（1988）对称R＆D／产品问题模型为基础，结合现实情况建立非对称模型，通过对模型的分析，证明内生序贯博弈是双方的理性选择，并进一步分析解释随着产业的演变，内生序贯博弈中双方的R＆D支出演变规律．

英文摘要：

This paper tends to explain the asymmetric R＆D phenomenon with the tool of Game Theory. The conflicting facts are domestic enterprises receiving R＆D spillovers from multinational enterprises in one hand while increase their own R＆D investment regularly. This research, based on the symmetric R＆D/product model of A＆J （1988）, build an asymmetric model according to reality. Analyzing with game theory, the model proved that endogenous sequential game is the rational choice of both sides. This research also explained the behavior of both sides in the game with the evolution of the industry, which is mainly represented with a decreasing spillover rate.