中文摘要：

与西方市场仅能观察到事务所变更不同的是，中国资本市场还同时提供了审计师变更的佐证。基于此，本文应用新制度经济学中的资产专有理论，从审计师和事务所两个角度，分析了中国证券市场特有的审计师／事务所变更行为，并结合盈余管理和审计意见进一步分析这种行为的原因和后果。文章通过对比签字审计师离开事务所并带走客户的公司与签字审计师离开事务所没有带走客户的公司后，发现在审计师“跳槽”之前，公司的盈余管理越强，越会跟随审计师到新的事务所，表明客户资源的控制权归审计师而非事务所所有。并且，我们还发现，这类公司在审计师变更前的审计质量更差。本文的研究丰富了审计理论的研究手段和现有成果，并对于规范审计师行为和提高审计独立性具有积极的理论价值和现实意义。

英文摘要：

Contrary to the capital markets in Western countries, both the auditor changes and the audit firm changes are easily observed in Chinese capital market. Therefore based on the new institutional economics, this paper analyzes the unique auditor or audit firm changes behavior in Chinese capital market from these two different respects. Further, this paper analyzes the reasons and the consequences of the two different kinds of changes, combining the earnings management and the audit opinions. In these auditor change events, there are two categories： the one is that the auditor changes office with his former clients, and the other is the auditor changes office without his former clients. The empirical results indicate that if earnings management is higher before the auditor change, the firm tends to follow the auditor to the new audit firm, which suggests that ownership of clients has been grasped by the auditor （ but not the audit firm ） . Meanwhile, we also find that the audit quality is lower in these firms before auditor changes.