中文摘要：

近年来，我国上市公司披露企业社会责任报告的现象越来越多，企业保证社会责任报告质量的方式有两种：一是独立第三方出具的企业社会责任报告鉴证意见；二是企业董事会对企业社会责任报告质量出具的自我承诺。这两种保证形式是否具有信息含量是大家所关心的问题。本文以沪深两市2009-2010年披露企业社会责任报告的940家上市公司为研究对象，依据信号传递理论，运用事件研究法研究发现：企业社会责任报告鉴证意见具有正向的市场反应，而董事会承诺不具有市场反应。根据我国的制度背景、理论分析和实证结果，从如何完善我国的企业社会责任报告鉴证标准、鉴证主体、鉴证客体、政府部门对董事会承诺的监管重点等方面提出了政策建议。

英文摘要：

Recently, more and more Chinese listed companies disclosure corporate social responsibility reports. Two ways are used to ensure the quality of corporate social responsibility report, which are corporate social responsibility report attestation opinion issued by independent third party and quality commitment issued by the board of directors of the enterprise who disclosures corporate social responsibility report. Whether the attestation opinion or quality commitment has information content is the problem that everybody cares. Using 940 listed companies that disclosured corporate social responsibility reports in 2009 and 2010 as samples, based on signaling theory and event study method, we find that corporate social responsibility report attestation opinion has significant positive effect on decision makers. However, quality commitment issued by the board of directors has no effect on decision makers. According to our system background, theoretical analysis and empirical evidence, we propose policy suggestions on improving corporate social responsibility report attestation standard, attestation subject, attestation object and government departments＇ regulatory focuses on the board＇s commitment.