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产权性质、薪酬差距与晋升激励
  • ISSN号:1008-3448
  • 期刊名称:南开管理评论
  • 时间:2014
  • 页码:4-12
  • 期号:04
  • 便笺:12-1288/F
  • 分类:F272.92[经济管理—企业管理;经济管理—国民经济]
  • 作者地址:上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院;
  • 作者机构:[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院
  • 相关基金:本文受国家自然科学基金面上项目(71272114)资助
作者: 缪毅;胡奕明;
中文摘要:

结合中国的特殊制度背景,本文对不同产权性质下高管内部薪酬差距的成因和激励效果问题进行了研究。通过手工搜集2005至2010年A股上市公司的高管薪酬数据发现,薪酬差距与竞争者人数以及经营风险正相关,并且这种联系在民营企业中表现得更为突出;此外,适当拉开薪酬差距的确对员工产生了激励作用,但过大的薪酬差距会产生不可忽视的负面影响。我们还发现,薪酬差距的激励作用受到晋升可能性的影响,也受到产权性质的影响,这种激励效果在民营企业、政府间接控制的企业、政府直接控制的企业依次减弱。本文的研究为企业如何更加有效地激励员工提供了理论框架和实证证据,同时也为解决国有企业的管理者激励问题指明了改革的方向。

英文摘要:

Combined with the special background of China, this article examines the incentive effect of pay gap in different types of enterprises, such as enterprises controlled by government directly, enterprises controlled by government indirectly and private enterprises. By collecting detailed compensation data of 'A shares listed company' from 2005 to 2010, we find that the company provides higher promotion incentive intensity or widen the pay gap when there are more competitors for promotion tournament or there are bigger operational risks that the company should face, and compa- nies that have higher degree of private ownership will enhance this mechanism of tournament which means the sensitivity between pay gap and competitors or risk will be stronger. We also find that moderate pay gap can keep employees working hard and let the company have better performance in the future, but if pay gap is beyond the reasonable scope, it will bring negative effects which cannot be ignored. Besides, further studies have suggested that the incentive effect of pay gap is affected not only by the possibility of promotion but the property rights as well, and this incentive effect becomes weaker in enterprises which are controlled by government directly than in private enterprises. This paper enriches the existing literature of promotion incentive and executive compensation in the situations of China. In addition, it provides theoretical framework and empirical evidence for the problem that how to motivate em- ployees more effectively in both state-owned enterprises and private enterprises. At this time, government regulators are carrying out a series of reform in state-owned enterprises, our research points out the future direction of current reform and provide good reference for it. Only using different incentive methods such as compensation and promotion properly can the incentive effect become much better mechanism, and the enterprises value will be increased much more as a result of better incentive.

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期刊信息
  • 《南开管理评论》
  • 北大核心期刊(2011版)
  • 主管单位:国家教育部
  • 主办单位:南开大学商学院
  • 主编:李维安
  • 地址:天津市南开区卫津路94号南开大学商学院
  • 邮编:300071
  • 邮箱:
  • 电话:022-23505995 23498167
  • 国际标准刊号:ISSN:1008-3448
  • 国内统一刊号:ISSN:12-1288/F
  • 邮发代号:6-130
  • 获奖情况:
  • 天津市第八届优秀期刊评选特别荣誉奖,第二届北方十佳期刊
  • 国内外数据库收录:
  • 中国中国人文社科核心期刊,中国北大核心期刊(2008版),中国北大核心期刊(2011版),中国北大核心期刊(2014版),中国社科基金资助期刊,中国国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库
  • 被引量:26296